The web will kill them all: new media, digital utopia, and political struggle in the Italian 5-Star Movement by Natale, Simone & Ballatore, Andrea
 Natale, S., Ballatore, A. The Web Will Kill Them All: New Media, Digital Utopia, and 
Political Struggle in the Italian 5-Star Movement. Media, Culture & Society 36.1 
(forthcoming in Jan. 2014). 
AUTHOR DRAFT 
 
The Web Will Kill Them All: New Media, Digital Utopia, and Political Struggle in the 
Italian 5-Star Movement 
 
Simone Natale, Columbia University, USA 
Andrea Ballatore, University College Dublin, Ireland 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the role of discourses about new media technology and the Web in the 
rise of the 5-Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, or M5S) in Italy. Founded by comedian and 
activist Beppe Grillo and Web entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio in 2009, this movement 
succeeded in becoming the second largest party at the 2013 national elections in Italy. This 
article aims to discuss how elements of digital utopia and Web-centric discourses have been 
inserted into the movement’s political message, and how the construction of the Web as a myth 
has shaped the movement’s discourse and political practice. The 5-Star Movement is compared 
and contrasted with other social and political movements in Western countries which have 
displayed a similar emphasis on new media, such as the Occupy movement, the Indignados 
movement, and the Pirate Parties in Sweden and Germany. By adopting and mutating cyber-
utopian discourses from the so-called Californian ideology, the movement symbolically identifies 
itself with the Web. The traditional political establishment is associated with “old” media 
 (television, radio, and the printed press), and represented as a “walking dead,” doomed to be 
superseded and buried by a Web-based direct democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
In February 2013, a veritable earthquake has hit the Italian political system: the 5-Star 
Movement, whose declared goal is to overthrow traditional parties and to promote the rise of a 
new form of Web-based direct democracy, scored an astounding result at the national elections, 
becoming the second largest party in Italy. This article aims to examine how digital utopianism 
and Web-enthusiastic claims have been shaping the 5-Star Movement’s presence in the Italian 
public sphere, as well as its political message. By taking into account the way new media are 
represented by the movement as the carriers of an opportunity for radical change in Italian 
society, and by framing it within contemporary discourses on Web- and cyber-utopianism, we 
will discuss how visions of new media interact with the broader worldview of the movement and 
its leaders.  
Although the 5-Star Movement - in Italian, Movimento 5 Stelle or M5S - introduced 
numerous novel elements into Italian politics (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013), especially two of 
which make it an highly relevant case for the study of new media. Firstly, the electoral success 
of M5S signalled the definitive emergence of digital media as a primary vehicle for political 
debate and political agency in Italy: the Web, in fact, functions as the main arena of discussion 
and internal cohesion for the movement. Such centrality of the Web proved to be particularly 
disrupting in the Italian context, given the previously widespread reluctance of Italian parties to 
consider the Web as a primary means for political communication (Vaccari, 2008). Secondly, 
 issues of digital culture play a paramount role in the political message of the 5-Star Movement. 
In fact, the two co-founders and leaders of M5S, professional comedian Beppe Grillo and Web 
entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio, combined their vigorous rallies against the Italian political 
and economic establishment with enthusiastic claims about the potential of the Web and of new 
media technologies.  
The article is organized in three parts. The first section provides a synthetic overview of 
the rise of the movement and of the personal story of its two leaders. In the second section, we 
examine the particular configurations of M5S’s digital utopias and its particular emphasis on the 
Web as a vehicle for revolutionary changes in Italian society. This is accomplished through a 
review of secondary literature and a qualitative analysis of two kinds of primary sources: the 
print books authored by the two leaders of the movement, Grillo and Casaleggio, and the 
articles published in the movement’s weblog, www.beppegrillo.it, since its launch in 2005. While 
the print books provide a wide overview of the political vision of the two leaders, Grillo’s blog 
has functioned as the movement’s main political platform and discussion forum. Finally, the third 
section addresses the question of how cyber-utopianist claims have been inserted into the 
movement’s political message, and how they have become an integral part of it. To answer this 
question, we argue that the rhetoric of the “digital revolution” helps reinforce the movement’s 
claim to be an element of potential change for the Italian political system. In particular, the claim 
that new media will “kill” old media, such as television and newspapers, is tightly associated to 
the movement’s own aspiration to defeat the old political class - in other words, to represent the 
new that will “kill” the old. In Grillo and Casaleggio’s political message, the upcoming media 
revolution is represented as a mirror of the political revolution they are fostering; the utopian 
trajectory of new media couples with the narrative of political and social redemption against the 
establishment that the movement strives to embody. 
 
2. Beppe Grillo and the Rise of the 5-Star Movement 
 Beppe Grillo’s career followed a complex trajectory, starting as a comedian and showman ion 
Italian television, then as an activist and campaigner in theatres, as a Web 2.0 political 
communicator, and finally becoming a full-fledged political leader. Originally from Genoa in 
Northern Italy, Grillo emerged in the late 1970s as a comedian, hired by RAI (the Italian public 
broadcasting company) to work in prime time TV variety shows, enjoying wide popular success 
as a volcanic and eclectic entertainer. In the 1980s, Grillo’s humour progressively turned overtly 
political and anti-establishment, making him an awkward presence in the politically tame RAI. 
During a prime-time show in 1986, Grillo famously made a joke asserting that the leaders of the 
Italian Socialist Party (in government at that time) were thieves, creating panic in the RAI 
management, and leading to his immediate dismissal. 
After a phase of spurious work within “old” media, Grillo publicly decided in 1993 to avoid 
TV, and started to run successful one-man shows in theatres and public squares. In the 1990s, 
his polemical targets extended from national malaffare (corruption) of the Italian élite, to 
international and global themes, including ecology, globalization, financial speculation, and 
consumerism, in an original combination of abrasive satire and counter-information. Grillo’s 
language is often offensive, and marked by frequent and liberating swearing (Pasquier, 2009; 
Ruggiero, 2012).  
Ironically if one considers Grillo’s later enthusiasm for digital media, one of his targets in 
this phase were personal computers, which he repeatedly described as a truffa (fraud) and 
smashed on stage. Grillo’s communication appeared to be an uneven mix of flaky conspiracy 
theories (Fo et al., 2013: 154) and investigative journalism, tapping his TV-induced popularity 
outside the mainstream mass-media circuit. Notably, in 2002 he warned about the debt of Italian 
agro-multinational Parmalat, months before the case erupted in the public sphere as the largest 
financial fraud in Europe in recent decades. 
 
2.1 Casaleggio and the digital turn 
 In 2004, having read some of his articles and books, Grillo contacted computer scientist and 
Web strategist Gianroberto Casaleggio (Biorcio and Natale, 2013). Casaleggio started his 
career in Italian high-tech firm Olivetti in the 1990s, and had authored several books and 
newspaper articles about the disruptive and liberating power of the Web. His work was strongly 
influenced by the digital enthusiasm of authors such as Nicholas Negroponte and Kevin Kelly, 
and was ideologically close to Wired magazine (Casaleggio, 2004; 2003). In the Italian context, 
Casaleggio was a pioneer of online communication and a member of the techno-intelligentsia 
that Barbrook and Cameron (1996) called the “virtual class.” Casaleggio managed to convince 
Grillo of the potential of the Web as a platform for his campaigns (Orsatti, 2010). In January 
2005, Casaleggio’s Web company (Casaleggio Associati srl) launched the Beppegrillo.it blog, 
coupling it with a one-man show tour named with the site’s URL. Grillo described the new 
project as an “instrument at our disposal to realize a true democracy” (Biorcio and Natale 2013: 
28). Grillo’s blog hosts a wide variety of multimedia content: incendiary political communiqués, 
video interviews, and satirical mashups. The blog rapidly became a platform to launch disparate 
campaigns, ranging from an attempt to make Italian MPs with a criminal record ineligible for 
office to a number of referenda about environmental issues (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013). 
Beppegrillo.it enjoyed the synergy between Grillo’s popularity and Casaleggio’s effective 
Web marketing. Casaleggio Associati took on most of Grillo’s management, including his shows, 
his books, and best-selling recorded shows on DVD. Frequent and engaging posts and video 
interviews with scientists, journalists, bloggers, and ordinary citizens about environmental and 
political issues attracted high volumes of traffic, and fostered discussions - and triggered many 
flames - in the blog’s comments. Many Anglo-American magazines consecrate Grillo’s Web 
presence by repeatedly ranking his blog among the top 10 world-wide, a particularly impressive 
result for an Italian website (Aldred et al., 2008; Van Gorsel, 2005). 
Under the intellectual influence of Casaleggio, Grillo experienced in this phase a radical 
turn in his opinion of digital technologies, moving away from scepticism to fully embrace digital 
 utopianism. In retrospect, Grillo acknowledges that, in that phase of his life, he realised that the 
Web had the potential to “change his relationship with the world, space, time, ... information and 
knowledge” (Fo et al., 2013: 72). In his shows, Grillo encouraged his audiences to organise 
themselves independently in local groups using the Meetup.com platform, which constituted the 
kernel of his later political movement, mixing online hacktivism and face-to-face, offline 
discussion and mobilization. 
In 2007, as meetups gained momentum, Grillo launched a controversial public protest 
called V-Day, where “v” stands for victory, for the cult graphic novel V For Vendetta and, more 
importantly, for the Italian insult vaffanculo (“fuck off”). During the event, Grillo collected more 
than 350,000 signatures for a bill about political corruption (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013). In 
this heated context, Grillo announced that, although he would not run directly for elections, he 
would support civic lists in local elections, named “friends of Beppe Grillo.” The first grillini 
(supporters of Grillo) were elected in 2008 and 2009, predominantly in small city councils. 
 
2.2 The birth and boom of the 5-Star Movement (M5S) 
In 2009, Grillo announced the birth of the Movimento Cinque Stelle, grouping the civic lists into a 
movement with national ambitions. The 5 stars in the name represented “water, environment, 
transport, connectivity, and development,” and one of the conditions to join the movement is not 
to be or have been a member of a political party. Casaleggio co-founded the movement with 
Grillo, and exerts control on the movement’s political and communication strategy - he is often 
called the “Web guru” behind the scenes. The movement is structured around a non-statute, i.e. 
a set of rules that regulate the hundreds of self-organized local meetups, using a franchise 
model. As no formal executive structure has yet been defined at the national level, Grillo and 
Casaleggio manage the movement predominantly in a top-down, centralised process (Biorcio 
and Natale 2013). In this initial phase, the movement was largely dominated by male, young, 
Northern, urban, educated, computer-literate members, who were close to (and disappointed by) 
 the moderate or radical left (Corbetta and Gualmini, 2013; Biorcio and Natale, 2013: 56-58). In 
the regional elections in March 2010, the movement competed in five regions, obtained about 
half a million votes, for a total 1.77% of the preferences. At the local elections in May 2011, the 
movement grew to 4.4%. 
The local elections in May-June 2012 marked a considerable surge in the movement’s 
popular support: Grillo’s movement boomed into a political force with a total of 11% of the votes 
(De Lucia, 2012). As Bordignon and Ceccarini (2013: 5) point out, the movement managed to 
"capitalise on the window of opportunity offered by the economic crisis and the social discontent 
about the new government’s austerity measures, in addition to the climate of increasing hostility 
towards the traditional parties." 
In October 2012, a few months before the national elections, opinion polls forecasted 
16% in national support of the movement (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013). On his blog and in 
public squares across the country, Grillo campaigned relentlessly against party-driven politics, 
overtly banning his candidates from engaging with political talk shows on national TV or with 
newspapers. At the national elections in February 2013, the movement became one of the major 
political forces in Italy, obtaining 25.6% of the votes at the Camera dei Deputati (the lower 
chamber), and 23.8% at the Senate, becoming the second largest party in Italy. The elections 
established the movement as a third, independent political pole, beside the centre-left led by 
Bersani’s Democratic Party, and the centre-right led by Silvio Berlusconi’s People of Freedom. 
In this ascendant trajectory (from about 2% to 25% in three years), the movement was 
pervaded by growing internal tensions, particularly between some local representatives and 
Grillo (and, less explicitly, Casaleggio). Disagreements between candidates and Grillo led to 
swift expulsions, raising concerns about the lack of internal democracy of the movement 
(Corbetta and Gualmini 2013). These tensions were also due to the fact that the composition of 
the supporters shifted rapidly from the dominance of the environmentalist left-wing to a more 
complex and cross-ideological structure. According to Biorcio and Natale (2013: 60-70), several 
 groups currently co-existed within the movement, ranging from disheartened leftists, moderate 
right-wingers, disaffected non-voters, to individuals from disadvantaged socio-economic groups, 
attracted to the xenophobic far-right aspects of the movement. 
 
2.3 M5S and Social Movements  
The M5S’s ascent in Italy can be compared to the trajectory of the Swedish and German Pirate 
Parties, which Grillo mentioned as an example of how a movement based on Internet 
participation could score important results in political electoral polls (Grillo, 2009). The Swedish 
Pirate Party was created in 2006 by a group of anti-copyright activists and hackers which had 
been previously known as the Piratbyrån (the Bureau of Piracy). The group launched the Pirate 
Bay website at the end of 2003, which rapidly became the world’s largest bittorrent-tracker. The 
Party had a moderate but significant success in local and political elections in Sweden (Miegel 
and Olsson, 2008). Based on this model, the German Pirate Party was also founded in 2006 
and has obtained important electoral results particularly since 2011, when the Party overcame 
the 5% threshold for the first time to enter the State parliament of Berlin. In the following years, 
the party also managed to enter the parliaments in other three German federal states: North-
Rhine Westphalia, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein. 
There are several points of similarity between the Pirate Parties and the M5S. Firstly, 
similarly to Grillo’s movement, the Pirate Parties shaped much of their political activity in 
opposition to the political establishment and to traditional political parties (Niedermayer, 2013). 
Secondly, the Pirate Parties also made intensive use of the Internet as a vehicle of political 
communication (Albers, 2010). Thirdly, the M5S share with the Swedish and German 
movements the use of cyber rhetoric and the enthusiastic embracing of digital media, often in 
opposition to “old” media such as television, newspapers, and the publishing industry, which are 
seen as obsolete and inadequate to today's changing social and political spheres (Erlingsson 
and Persson, 2011; Schweitzer, 2011; Löblich and Wendelin, 2012). Moreover, similarly to the 
 Pirates, Casaleggio and Grillo believe that “in the Web copyright is not only useless, but also 
harmful” (2011: 120). Yet, an important difference between the M5S and the Pirate Parties is the 
fact that Grillo and Casaleggio’s agenda is wider: the Pirates’ political activity, in fact, mostly 
concern issues of internet citizenship and copyright.  
The M5S can also be compared with international social movements such as Occupy 
and the Indignad@s. In April 2012, for instance, Grillo mentioned the Indignad@s to support his 
claim that political change could only come through the use of the Internet as a democratic tool 
(Grillo, 2012a). As many have noted, the Occupy and Indignad@s movements have been 
characterized by the combination of online activism with the use and occupation of public 
spaces (Castells, 2012; Dhaliwal, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2012; Juris, 2012) - a strategy also 
employed by Grillo. There are, however, also important elements of difference between the M5S 
and the aforementioned movements. While Occupy and the Indignad@s movements are mostly 
regarded as leftist, the political collocation of M5S is more unclear and ambiguous, especially 
after the boom of 2012. This has resulted in ambivalent reactions to the rise of M5S within the 
Italian Left (Wu Ming, 2013). 
Another key difference is connected to the issue of leadership: while the Pirate Parties, 
Occupy, the Indignad@s and other new social movements refuse any fixed or long-term political 
leadership (Milkman et al., 2012; Pino, 2013; Razsa and Kurnik, 2012; Stavrides, 2012), Grillo 
and Casaleggio’s leadership has been evident in all phases in the development of the M5S, and 
was only occasionally challenged by members who called for more internal democracy (Fornaro, 
2012).  
 
3. Cyber-Utopianism and Digital Rhetoric in the 5-Star Movement 
Throughout the last two decades, the dominant political forces in Italy have largely ignored the 
digital revolution, observing it with suspicion and scepticism. Prior to the case of M5S in the 
2013 political elections, national campaigns had been mainly orchestrated through “traditional” 
 media such as television and the press (Mazzoleni, 1995; Statham, 1996). Since the 
development of TV in the 1950s and the foundation of RAI, public television channels have 
been dominated by political parties (Padovani, 2005). In recent years, the leading private TV 
network, Mediaset, has been owned or indirectly controlled by the former prime minister and 
media mogul Silvio Berlusconi (Mazzoleni, 2000; Hibberd, 2007; Balbi and Prario, 2010). Nor 
have the political biases of Italian television been counterweighted by press media: as Peppino 
Ortoleva (1998) points out, Italian newspapers have been traditionally owned by private 
companies or have been under the influence of particular private interests, functioning as an 
element of pressure on the government and politics and taking up the role which lobbies play in 
countries where lobbying is legal and regulated, such as the United States. 
The M5S partially subverted this state of affairs, thrusting Web-politics at the centre of 
the Italian political arena (Vergani, 2011). Such radical change in the mechanics of political 
communication has come together with the increasing relevance of discourses on new media 
within Italian political debate. Casaleggio and Grillo have taken up some of the strongest 
arguments of cyber-utopianists and digital enthusiasts, introducing them to the centre of the 
Italian political arena. 
 
3.1 New Media and the Digital Sublime 
In order to better comprehend the particular vision of digital media developed by the M5S and its 
leaders, it is useful to address briefly what the so-called “cyber-“ or “digital utopianism” is and 
what its main claims are. In media studies, a long-standing scholarly tradition aims to illuminate 
the role of technological utopianism in the reception of new technologies.  
One of the key concepts within this tradition is the notion of the “technological sublime,” 
as employed by Leo Marx (1964). Marx notes that the sentiment of wonder stimulated by the 
contemplation of technology and mechanization is a specific aspect of American culture. With 
the technological sublime, technological novelties and achievements are represented as the 
 carriers of a quasi-pastoral message of faith for progress and modernity. In 1970, James W. 
Carey and John J. Quirk (1970) took up this concept and adapted it to the specific case of the 
history of electrical media, using the term “electrical sublime” to label the enthusiastic responses 
which originated in the nineteenth century after the introduction of the electrical telegraph. As 
Carey observes, “electricity promised, so it seemed, the same freedom, decentralization, 
ecological harmony, and democratic community that had hitherto been guaranteed but left 
undelivered by mechanization” (Carey, 1989: 123).  
The notion of the electrical sublime has been widely influential in media history and 
media studies, shaping the work of many influential scholars in these areas of inquiry (Nye, 
1994; Corn, 1986; Sturken et al., 2004). With the emergence of a literature on new media, this 
concept has also been applied to the case of digital media, as in Vincent Mosco’s examination 
of the rhetoric of the “digital sublime.” Mosco noted that digital media today "embody and drive 
important myths about our time" (2004: 2), similarly to how some of the most significant cultural 
dreams of their age were embodied by the telegraph in middle-nineteenth-century America 
(Czitrom, 1982), by the telephone in the late nineteenth century (Marvin, 1988), or by wireless 
and radio broadcasting in the early twentieth century (Douglas, 2004).  
The “digital sublime” –or “cyber-utopianism” (Morozov, 2011) - has been an important 
topic of interest in new media studies and related disciplines. Fred Turner (2006) identifies its 
roots in the countercultural movements of the 1970s, while others traces back the emergence of 
cyber-utopias to the Cold War (Barbrook, 2007). In recent years, as authors such as Patrice 
Flichy (2007) and Siva Vaidhyanathan (2011) well underline, supporters of the digital utopia 
have mostly identified the Internet as the carrier of a plethora of changes which should drive, so 
the argument goes, towards a more decentralized, democratic, and libertarian society. In this 
context, the Internet is regarded not much, or not only as, a technical system, but rather as a 
cultural myth. According to Vincent Mosco, in fact, myths are “stories that animate individuals 
and societies by providing paths to transcendence that lift people out of the banality of everyday 
 life” (2004: 3; see Ortoleva, 2009; Karim, 2001). In this sense, digital media are embedded in a 
well-established, utopian narrative, by which they are represented as a liberating force, as the 
main actors of change within a free-market-oriented understanding of progress (Duguid, 1996). 
As discussed in the next section, the Web plays such a mythical role in Casaleggio and Grillo's 
rhetoric. 
 
3.2 The Web as a Myth 
Digital utopianism plays a crucial role in M5S’s worldview. In particular, the Web (la Rete) is 
deployed in the M5S’s rhetoric as a myth in Mosco’s sense. Grillo and Casaleggio describe the 
Web as a transparent, unified, coherent entity, with its own logic, laws, agency and disruptive 
agenda. The Web, as a mythical panacea, can and “wants” to cure the social and economic ills 
of Italy, leading the nation towards a more desirable future. The Web is a “supermedium” 
(Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 7) which will radically change all political, social, informational, and 
organizational processes. 
One of key endeavours of the M5S is the re-moralisation of politics. In their view, the 
Web reduces corruption in a technologically deterministic way, fostering radical transparency. 
For instance, in the context of E.U. funding fraud, Grillo asserted that “it would be great if this 
money could be monitored on the Web. (…) One doesn’t steal through the Web” (Casaleggio 
and Grillo, 2011: 54). Unlike political parties, online communities are characterised by solidarity 
and transparency (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 46). Through its “eternal memory” the Web 
imposes a strict but healthy discipline on society. The possibility of retrieving old news stories 
and the difficulty of removing content from search engines and mirror websites enforces a 
constant surveillance on individuals, who are constrained by their past actions (Casaleggio and 
Grillo, 2011: 38). 
Digital utopianism is usually characterised by a firm belief in self-organising systems. As 
Morozov (2011: 286) points out, the new intermediating structures are often as centralised as 
 the old ones; yet, inspired by the success of decentralised Internet projects such as Wikipedia, 
cyber-utopianists tend to underplay the role of a few big corporations in the organization of the 
Web. Ignoring the emergence of new intermediaries in the media landscape (including 
themselves and their blog), Grillo and Casaleggio claim that “the Web does not want 
intermediaries” (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 10). Therefore, a “large part of the hierarchical 
structure which rules our society will disappear” (7). Notably, Grillo refers to the traffic in Delhi as 
a successful example of “organized disorganization”, in which each mobile subject conquers its 
own space without rules constraining its movement.” In this way, “without rules, there is still a 
rule” (Fo et al., 2013: 20-21).  
An extreme and near-religious version of digital utopianism is the so-called “Singularity,” 
the idea that exponential technological development will enable a world of hyper-intelligent 
beings, transcending the current biological limitations of the human condition (Kurzweil, 2005). 
Because of the Web, Grillo and Casaleggio believe that “the increase in collective and individual 
intelligence is accelerating and (...) humanity will finally be able to address problems such as 
energy, global warming, and desertification” (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 146).  For example, 
global warming could be solved by connected individuals, if only they had suitable apps (172); 
the Web will reduce the amount of transport and material goods, implementing through 3D 
printing the idea of teleportation (133). Similarly to Kurzweil, Casaleggio claims that “in the 
future our brain will be global” (Fo et al., 2013: 70).  
Singularity discourses are characterised by bold and frequent forecasts. As Barbrook 
(2007: 180) points out, the emergence of the information society in the U.S. in the mid-twentieth 
century was accompanied by a plethora of predictions about the future, largely inspired by 
McLuhan’s visionary musings about the Global Village. In this sense, Casaleggio has developed 
his own peculiar futurology. In an animated short film, Gaia, the future of politics,1 his company 
                                               
1
 The video is available at the following webpage: http://www.casaleggio.it/media/video/gaia-il-futuro-della-
politica-1.php  
 outlines his peculiar vision of the planet’s future. In a technologically deterministic and bizarre 
sci-fi narrative, human history unfolds as a sequence of media-driven revolutions. The future will 
be dominated by sci-fi mega-corporations such as Google’s Earthlink and Braintrust, a 
“collective social intelligence,”  and after a series of cataclysmic disasters, the Web will finally 
make man “the only owner of his destiny.” Furthermore, in the short Prometeus, the media 
revolution,2 Casaleggio predicts that by 2015 the Web will dissolve all existing media, including 
television, radio, books, and newspapers. American corporations such as Amazon and Google 
will launch virtual reality services reminiscent of the memory-selling corporation in Philip Dick’s 
We Can Remember It for You Wholesale. A new mega-information multinational, Prometeus, 
will “finance space missions” and will become “the new reality,” finally triggering the Singularity 
and incarnating the myth of the Web. 
 
3.3 The Californian ideology and the Web as electronic agora or marketplace  
The M5S’s digital utopianism has much in common with the so-called “Californian ideology,” 
described by Barbrook and Cameron (1996) as “a bizarre mish-mash of hippie anarchism and 
economic liberalism beefed up with lots of technological determinism”, which emerged in the 
1990s in the U.S. from high-tech industry. The Californian ideology is characterized by a strong 
faith in the liberating and emancipatory power of the new digital technologies, and combines 
aspects of the anti-corporate ethos of 1970s counterculture with an entrepreneurial and laissez-
faire approach to the economy and in the public sphere (Turner, 2006). Grillo and Casaleggio’s 
cyber-rhetoric replicates this internal tension between the “electronic agora” of direct democracy 
and the neoliberal “electronic marketplace” driven by competition and efficiency, re-casting them 
from the North-American to the Italian context.  
According to Grillo and Casaleggio, the Web as an electronic marketplace imposes new 
and efficient economic rules. Casaleggio praises the extreme economic competition online, 
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 Available at: http://www.casaleggio.it/media/video/video.php   
 stating that “in the Web, there is no number two. There is only the number one. There is only the 
winner” (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 5). Grillo remarks that even prostitutes do their business 
online, without the inefficient and unfair mediation of pimps (Fo et al., 2013: 114). On the other 
hand, Grillo and Casaleggio also claim that “the Web is Franciscan, anti-capitalistic. Online, 
ideas and sharing ideas are worth more than money” (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 8). Ideas are 
only good or bad, beyond the left-right ideological spectrum (Fo et al., 2013: 89). Despite the 
fact that successful Web companies need substantial cash flows to support their operations, the 
Web only needs abstract, sharable ideas and not financial capital, fostering gift economies. For 
example, they claim that the Web frees music from capitalist constraints, empowering 
independent musicians (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 157). 
Furthermore, while Casaleggio and Grillo cheer the dissolution of bureaucratic models 
that dominated the 20th century (Turner, 2006: 239), they also denounce the social impact of 
neo-liberal economics, based on unstable and “liquid” arrangements between employers and 
workers (Grillo, 2012b). With such an ambivalent and contradictory attitude towards capitalism, 
the rhetoric of M5S differs from North-American digital utopianism, which since the 1990s has 
decidedly joined the libertarian right (Natale, 2012). Although Casaleggio sees the Web 
primarily as the ultimate marketplace, Grillo tends to be more excited about its potential as 
agora, which will be populated by more informed and rational citizens: “The citizens who find 
information online do not watch TV, and do not read newspapers. They live in a parallel 
dimension. They are informed, the others are disinformed by Power” (Casaleggio and Grillo, 
2011: 10). Scams, hoaxes, and unreliable news notwithstanding, the Web is “the medium that 
gets closest to truth” (88). 
One of “Web’s laws”, used as a slogan of the M5S, echoing the traditional “one person, 
one vote” slogan, is that on the Web “one is worth one” (7). The myth of the Web promises to 
enable a real direct democracy, opposed to the mediated, corrupt liberal democracy, which does 
not involve citizens in key decisions. For example, “Ask an Italian whether he prefers an efficient 
 hospital or to bomb Libya (…) His answer will always be different to that of politicians” (13). The 
egalitarian promise of the Web is pushed by Casaleggio and Grillo to the extreme, claiming that 
“the concept of ‘leader’ in the Web is blasphemy” (11). Hence, an elected representative is not 
an independent agent, but has to function as a “terminal” that reflects the will of thousands of 
people. 
This cyber-utopian view of direct democracy, characterised by Corbetta and Gualmini 
(2013: 197) as “Web populism,” is contrasted with a dying liberal democracy. The existing 
clumsy, expensive, and inefficient Italian political apparatus will be replaced with the electronic 
agora by tapping the wisdom of crowds (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 185). Similarly, the 
corrupting power of money and personal ambition will be washed away by crowd-funded politics. 
Casaleggio and Grillo claim that low wages, no perks, and the possibility of revoking delegates’ 
mandate will ensure that rapacious career politicians will not exploit Italian institutions for their 
personal profit, as they have done in the past. The tension between marketplace and agora 
underlies the relationship between M5S’s cyber-utopianism and broader political themes, 
analysed in the next section. 
 
4. “They Are All Walking Dead”: Old Media, New Media, and Political Change 
Examining the case of the Occupy movement in Boston, Jeffrey Juris points out that “networking 
technologies did more than facilitate the expansion of network forms; they shaped new political 
subjectivities based on the network as an emerging political and cultural ideal” (2012: 260). The 
use of mobile technologies and the Web not only extends the ability to reach and involve 
persons in the activities of the movement, but also shapes the way its members conceived their 
activism and, to a certain extent, their positions on political and social matters. In the case of 
M5S, too, the relevance of the Web as a communication forum has also helped shape the 
worldview of the movement and of many of its members, especially in relation to the perception 
 that the development of new information technology might result in radical changes for the 
whole of Italian society (Corbetta and Gualmini 2013).  
This section will address the following questions: how do elements of cyber-utopianism 
and Web-enthusiasm interact with the broader political vision of M5S, and to what extent do they 
contribute its formation? The answer becomes evident if we consider that the idea of change 
and rupture with the past is one the main elements, if not the main one, in the political message 
of the movement. In this context, the Web and digital media, opposed to “old” media such as 
television and the press, function as a symbolical replication of the M5S’s contraposition to the 
“old” political establishment. New media, therefore, are employed not only as a vehicle for 
political communication, but also as a “technological myth” (Karim, 2001) which operates to 
support the overall political ideology of the movement. To use Beppe Grillo’s own words, 
television and political parties, parliamentary democracy and the printed press are nothing but 
“walking dead.” The enthusiasm for new digital media reinforces the movement’s claim that 
traditional political parties belong to a past which will soon be over.  
 
4.1 The Media War 
The myth of the Web is only one facet in the technological utopianism of the digital age. Another 
common narrative, in fact, connects the rise of new digital media with the crisis and the eventual 
disappearing of “old,” non-digital media. According to this argument, the advent of a new digital 
age is connected with the disruption of the “old” media of the past (Thorburn and Jenkins, 2003; 
Balbi, 2005).  
The idea that new media would “kill” the old ones has often played a leading role in 
contemporary cyber-utopias. Technologists of this ideological leaning, such as Stewart Brand, 
Nicholas Negroponte and Kevin Kelly, have often forecasted the oncoming death of the print 
book (Nunberg, 1996) or of television (Spigel, 2005) and other old media as a necessary 
complement to the digital revolution. According to these cyber enthusiasts, the disappearance of 
 these media should be greeted as evidence of technological and social progress. As Morozov 
(2013) notes, their vision enforces the perception that we are experiencing an unprecedented 
period of rupture. More broadly, as Duguid (1996) points out, the ‘myth’ of the disappearing old 
media reveals a vision of media change as shaped by a logic of “supersession,” by which the 
introduction of new media comes at the expense of older ones, through a dynamic of 
substitution rather than coexistence and hybridisation.  
The enthusiasm for digital media which characterizes the M5S is strongly bound to this 
logic of supersession. In Grillo and Casaleggio’s rhetoric, an actual war is going on between an 
old, analogue, unfair, polluting world, and a digital, ecological, Web-centric and just world 
(Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011). In Grillo’s blog, the idea that there are “two Italys” emerges 
extremely often. The country is seen as divided into two contrasting blocks: “one which finds 
information in the Web, the other which founds disinformation in newspapers and television” 
(Grillo, 2008b). These two blocks are, in the rhetoric employed by M5S, fighting a “media war” 
(Grillo, 2008a).  
Such military language characterizes both Grillo’s furious accusations against the 
political establishment and his invectives against television and the printed press. In one of his 
blog posts, Grillo goes so far as to point out that old media are fighting a “Third World War” in 
the attempt to survive the challenges brought up by the digital turn. According to his tirade, this 
war is not fought on the battlefield, but in the editorial offices of newspapers and television; the 
weapons are not bombs, but rather the lies and the news which are hidden from the public 
(Grillo, 2013b).  
 
4.2 The End of Old Media and of the Political Establishment 
In his rallies, Grillo contrasts the life of his digital movement with the “dead” analogue media and 
politicians. “We are alive, alive! We came out of the catacombs. (...) We are alive in a country of 
dead people, of old people who occupy all spaces and believe they are eternal, who nourish 
 themselves with power and have fucked life” (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 154). The refrain of 
the “walking dead,” and the “mummies” (188) recurs with astounding regularity in the blog as 
well as in Grillo’s and Casaleggio’s books. These terms are employed in reference both to old 
media and to the representatives of the political establishment: for instance, Pierluigi Bersani, 
the leader of the Center-Left coalition during the political elections, is defined as a “talking dead” 
by Grillo in a post published shortly after the 2013 national polls (Grillo, 2013a).  
Grillo and Casaleggio’s cyber-utopianism is characterised by frequent and bold 
prophecies regarding the disappearance of non-digital media. In a post aptly titled “The End of 
Old Media” the rising volume of visits to Grillo’s blog is compared to the number of visits to the 
internet sites of two “traditional” media, daily newspapers L’Unità and Il Giornale. The statistics 
are offered as an evidence of the claim that old media are dying (Grillo, 2005). In this way, Grillo 
identifies the success of his blog (and of himself) with the rise of new media, which are destined 
to “kill” the old ones.  
Television is seen by Grillo and Casaleggio as the most dreaded symbol of the corrupt 
establishment. Netflix and streaming are destroying the DVD rental market, and TV will be their 
next victim (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 165). Newspapers are also regarded as part of the 
corrupt analogue ancien régime. The potential for more reliable and balanced news is to be 
found in digital citizen journalism (95). Other old media are equally doomed. Traditional 
communication companies have been one of the favourite targets of Grillo’s indictments in the 
2000s (Pasquier, 2009). He often compared and contrasted Telecom Italia, the country’s main 
telephone service provider, with Skype, suggesting that the old, expensive, corrupt company will 
be annihilated by the new, transparent, and efficient Internet-based medium. Similarly, print 
books are seen as obsolete, in contrast to the Web and e-books, which are often mentioned by 
Grillo and Casaleggio as a key aspect to overhaul primary and secondary education (Fo et al., 
2013: 105). 
 The M5S’s “war” against old media cannot be fully understood if one does not take into 
account Grillo’s own story. As reported above, Grillo’s career has been characterized since 1993 
by two different, but interconnected struggles: against the political establishment which had 
contributed to his dismissal from RAI; and against the media of television and, to a lesser extent, 
the printed press, from which he had been excluded. In this sense, Grillo’s personal story - a 
narrative of redemption - contributes to explain why claims that old media are “walking dead,” 
deemed to disappearance or obsolescence, play such as a strong role in the M5S’s version of 
cyber-utopian theories. His struggles are also the struggles of the 5-Star Movement; his battle 
against the political establishment is also the battle of the movement; his refusal to appear on 
TV reverberates in the rules that each elected member of M5S has to agree upon, which strictly 
prohibit any appearance on talk-shows or on other TV programs. 
As Giuseppe Mazza (2012: 182) observes, “more than a struggle between opinions, 
what is at stake is a struggle between communications media.” From the movement’s viewpoint, 
since television is influenced by the parties, and the parties use it against the M5S, television 
and talk shows are “weapons” (Grillo, 2012a) targeting the movement. The movement’s struggle 
against the political establishment is also the struggle against TV and newspapers which are 
influenced or controlled by this establishment. In Grillo and Casaleggio’s view, the Web is going 
to kill not only the old media, but also the “old” party politics.  
This is, ultimately, the goal of M5S: the supersession of party politics in favour of digital 
direct democracy (Grillo, 2011; Fo et al., 2013: 79). The inadequacy of the Italian political class 
is made manifest by their inability to use new media and to communicate via the Web. For 
instance, Casaleggio and Grillo report how the Italian president, Giorgio Napolitano, when 
opening a YouTube channel, deactivated the comment function. Such behaviour is compared to 
Barack Obama’s communication strategies: the speeches of the American president which are 
posted online always allows users to post commentaries, fostering rather than limiting the 
citizens’ participation (Casaleggio and Grillo, 2011: 37-38). This demonstrates, in Grillo’s view, 
 how much Italian politicians have become out of touch with the Web-informed society; how 
much, in other words, they have been superseded by the digital turn. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The emphasis on change and on the rupture with the past is one of the strongest rhetorical 
claims employed by politicians throughout the world to win elections and to communicate a 
positive message to their potential voters (Szarka, 2009; Panizza, 2004). The rise of the 5-Star 
Movement in Italy is an example of how the rhetoric of political change and the rhetoric of the 
digital revolution can interact with each other, merging into a unique, coherent discourse. In 
M5S’s digital utopianism, the claim that old media are dead is indissoluble from the claim that 
the Italian establishment is likewise “dead” and that a political earthquake driven by the 
movement will erase and supersede traditional parties. The two claims mutually support each 
other: the establishment is dead because it relies on old media that are destined to become 
irrelevant; the old media are irrelevant because they are controlled by the establishment and, as 
a consequence, do not represent Italian citizens.  
The examination of the rise of the 5-Star Movement in Italian politics and of its vision on 
new media, therefore, sheds light on how discourses on digital technologies may be framed in 
wider political messages. Fully integrated into M5S’s political message, the digital turn 
represents a powerful narrative of change and disruption, centred around the mythical 
appropriation of the Web as the catalyst of revolutionary change. The struggle of the new 
against the old is represented as a “war” (in Grillo’s own words) which takes place at the same 
time in the political arena and in the media system. The dynamics of competition between old 
and new media contribute, in this sense, to reinforcing the vision and the promise of a new 
political order, based on the abrupt dismissal of what, according to M5S’s rhetoric, should 
belong exclusively to the past.  
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